Revision notice · Rev003 · 10 November 2026. This web edition is part of the GLIAG revision package GLIAG-REV-SP-20261110-02 and supersedes the Rev002 text. Version of record (DOI): 10.5281/zenodo.24114928 · Download the full 18-page PDF with all six GLIAGOGRAPHs.

Companion web editions: Debt vs. Net Sovereign Cash (Paper I and the 2030 test) · GranMorgu’s Revenue Waterfall (Paper II) · Gas-to-Shore and Refinery (Paper III and GIP) · Live decision tool: GLIAG Intelligence Platform (GIP) · gliag.com

Investor brief

S&P Global Ratings raised Suriname to B-/B with a stable outlook on 9 November 2026, citing gold income, debt management and GranMorgu first oil from mid-2028 (S&P Global Ratings, 9 November 2026). The upgrade improves the financing context. It does not tell a Treasury how many dollars arrive, when they arrive or what remains after debt payment, which is the question these three GLIAG papers answer.

GLIAG’s six findings for investors, lenders and the Ministry of Finance and Planning:

  1. The decisive Republic test is 2030, not 2028. Public Eurobond terms show US$525 million at 7.70% maturing in 2030 and US$1,315 million at 8.50% maturing in 2035 (IMF 2025 Article IV; IMF Post-Financing Assessment, June 2026). Known Eurobond service in 2030 is about US$677 million. Block 58 royalty alone at the IMF baseline ($74/bbl, 86.1 MMbbl in 2030) is about US$398 million, a 0.59× partial coverage. Under a stylised version of the IMF adverse case it falls to 0.28×.
  2. The VRI is gone. The IMF reports that the oil-linked Value Recovery Instruments were repurchased on 16 January 2026 with no change in the debt stock (IMF PFA). Rev002’s wording on “any surviving VRI” is withdrawn: 100% of Block 58 royalty now accrues to the Republic.
  3. Two ledgers, never one. Staatsolie’s 20% GranMorgu share is funded, not carried: about US$2.4 billion, including a US$1.6 billion facility from 18 banks (Staatsolie, 14 May 2025) equal to about 35% of GDP (IMF 2025 Article IV). Its debt service sits in Ledger B; only paid dividends reach Ledger A.
  4. The spendable layer depends on a law that does not yet operate. From 2026 all mineral revenue is to flow to the Savings and Stabilization Fund Suriname (SSFS), but S&P reports that the 2024 SSFS and PFM fiscal rules are not operational, and the government plans the legal amendment in the second half of 2027, less than a year before first oil (Government of Suriname).
  5. The credit path is steep but source-dependent. S&P projects general government debt falling from 104.7% of GDP in 2025 to 33.8% in 2029; the IMF projects central government debt at 58.1% in 2028 and 35.1% in 2031. S&P’s narrative expects a current-account surplus by 2028 while its own table shows −12.7% of GDP that year. GLIAG keeps the conflict visible.
  6. Downstream value is a proposal, priced as a sensitivity. Gas-to-Shore and the New Refinery are GLIAG proposals. Their 15%/25%/35% proxy adds US$2,161.65 million, US$3,602.75 million or US$5,043.85 million over 2026–2050 as arithmetic only, not government cash.

GLIAG’s view is that Suriname’s oil decade begins with a two-year window (mid-2028 to end-2030) in which first-oil receipts, the SSFS deposit rule, Staatsolie’s own loan service and the first Republic bond maturity overlap. The Republic can pass that test, but only if the payment calendar is built instrument by instrument and published before the first royalty dollar arrives.

The analysis builds on GLIAG’s own published research on Petroleum & Energy Insights, including GranMorgu field production, depletion and revenue modelling 2028–2048 (March 2025), the Gran Morgu fiscal assessment 2028–2053 (February 2026), the Staatsolie GranMorgu financing facility investor briefing (July 2025) and the SSFS white paper (August 2025).

1. The credit baseline after 9 November 2026

S&P’s upgrade to B- rests on three published pillars: higher gold income (output up 44% year on year to June 2026), a debt stock refinanced at longer tenor, and an oil ramp-up from mid-2028 with peak output by 2030 (S&P Global Ratings). Moody’s rates Suriname Caa1 with a positive outlook (27 March 2026) (Moody’s rating action). The Financial Times frames GranMorgu as a US$10.5 billion bet on a “new dawn” for a country that needed a US$572 million IMF programme (FT Film), and Bloomberg recorded the return to global bond markets in October 2025.

Indicator (S&P, 9 Nov 2026) 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Real GDP growth, % n/a 4.0 4.1 28.2 43.4
General government balance, % GDP n/a −5.4 −3.9 +1.6 +3.5
Gross GG debt, % GDP 104.7 86.6 77.3 54.3 33.8
Interest / revenues, % 11.8 13.6 12.2 9.1 7.2
Current account, % GDP −53.3 −43.5 −50.2 −12.7 +22.2
GDP per capita, US$ thousand 7.3 n/a n/a n/a 20.3

Source: S&P Global Ratings, 9 November 2026. S&P also reports 84% of general government debt in foreign currency, non-residents holding 97% of commercial debt, CPI inflation of about 10% in 2026, an institutional score of 6, resident foreign-currency deposits above 50% and a central bank that cannot act as lender of last resort.

The IMF’s Post-Financing Assessment of 10 June 2026 sets real growth at 28.5% in 2028 and 43.5% in 2029, central government debt falling from 105.8% of GDP in 2025 to 58.1% in 2028 and 35.1% in 2031, reserves of US$1.8 billion (112% of the ARA metric) and an escrow balance of about US$475 million (8% of GDP) at end-March 2026 that is not counted as reserves (IMF PFA). Staff recommend a 2026 primary surplus of about 3.4% of GDP and flag more than US$500 million of Eurobond amortisation in 2030.

Figure 1. The credit path and its source conflict. The GLIAGOGRAPH for this section is in the version of record: download the Rev003 PDF from Zenodo.

FACT. S&P and the IMF agree on direction: oil turns the debt ratio from above 100% of GDP to near one third by 2029–2031.

MISSING. A single, dated perimeter. S&P reports general government debt; the IMF reports central government debt; the national debt office reports a legal ratio of 119.6% at end-June 2026 against a 60% ceiling that is waived until 31 December 2027 (Rio Times).

GLIAG JUDGEMENT. Debt-to-GDP falls mainly because the denominator jumps. Ratios do not pay coupons; dollars do. Investors should read the 2028–2029 ratio collapse as a GDP effect first and a cash effect second.

TRIGGER. GLIAG revises this baseline when S&P or the IMF publish a new vintage, when the debt office publishes an instrument-level schedule, or when first-oil timing moves outside H2 2028.

Domestic critics add a budget warning. The Suriname Economists’ Association estimates the real 2026 deficit at about 7.7% of GDP against the official 5.1% (Rio Times, 1 November 2026). The 2027 budget projects revenue of SRD 70.1 billion, spending of SRD 80.9 billion and a deficit of SRD 10.8 billion, about 4% of GDP (Government of Suriname), with debt service of about US$433.6 million, close to 23% of 2027 spending (Rio Times). GLIAG’s fiscal management guide for Suriname’s oil era (May 2026) set out why pre-oil deficits must close before oil cash arrives rather than after.

2. The 2030 test: a first instrument-level anchor

Rev002 stated that no Republic-only payment calendar could be built from public data. That is partly correct for total debt but no longer for the commercial bond layer. In November 2025 the Republic issued US$1.575 billion of Eurobonds: US$525 million at 7.70% due 2030 and US$1.05 billion at 8.50% due 2035 (IMF 2025 Article IV; Clifford Chance). In February 2026 it tapped the 2035 line for US$265 million (IMF PFA).

GLIAG arithmetic: annual coupons are US$525m × 7.70% + US$1,315m × 8.50% = US$40.4m + US$111.8m = US$152.2 million. That figure matches, to the decimal, the US$152.2 million of interest the debt plan reports as already held in escrow (Rio Times), which confirms the instrument terms used here. Escrow covers Eurobond interest until 2028 (IMF 2025 Article IV).

Republic Eurobond layer, US$m 2026–2029 (each) 2030 2031–2034 (each) 2035
Coupons 152.2 152.2 111.8 111.8
Bullet principal 0 525.0 0 1,315.0
Total known service 152.2 677.2 111.8 1,426.8

The royalty is the cleanest Republic receipt because it is levied on gross revenue before cost recovery. Les Echos reports the Block 58 rate at 6.25% of gross revenue against Guyana’s 2% (Les Echos), consistent with GLIAG’s reading of the Suriname Model PSC (June 2026). The IMF selected-indicators table projects oil output of 32.0 MMbbl in 2028, 86.3 MMbbl in 2029, 86.1 MMbbl in 2030 and 86.0 MMbbl in 2031, at an average Brent of US$74/bbl over 2027–2031 (IMF PFA).

Royalty alone, US$m (6.25% × volume × price) 2028 2029 2030 2031
IMF baseline: $74/bbl 148.0 399.1 398.2 397.8
IMF adverse, GLIAG stylisation: $53/bbl, start H2 2029, volume −34% 0 70.0 188.7 188.2
Coverage of known 2030 Eurobond service 0.59× / 0.28×

Cross-check: the IMF projects Block 58 royalties at 2.8% of GDP in 2029 and 2.7% in 2030. With S&P’s 2029 GDP per capita of US$20.3 thousand and a population of about 0.65 million (GLIAG assumption), 2.8% of GDP is about US$370 million, within 8% of GLIAG’s US$399 million. The difference fits a realised-price discount to Brent.

Figure 2. The 2030 test. The GLIAGOGRAPH for this section is in the version of record: download the Rev003 PDF from Zenodo.

FACT. The 2030 bullet falls in the first full plateau year under the IMF baseline and in the first full production year under its adverse case, where 2031 fiscal revenues are 21% lower and export receipts 29% lower (IMF PFA).

MISSING. Bilateral, multilateral, IMF repurchase and domestic debt service; exact coupon and maturity dates; any amortising features of the 2035 line; profit-oil and income-tax receipts by year; Staatsolie dividend policy during its loan amortisation.

GLIAG JUDGEMENT. The 0.59× ratio is a royalty-only partial measure, not a DSCR, and it is deliberately conservative. Government profit oil is thin in the first years because cost recovery takes priority, and the income tax and Staatsolie dividend lines are not yet calendared. GLIAG’s view is that 2030 is manageable at baseline once profit oil and tax are added, and that the adverse case makes 2030 a refinancing or SSFS-withdrawal decision rather than a royalty-funded payment. The 2035 bullet of US$1.3 billion is the larger number but arrives after five plateau years, when the SSFS should hold several years of deposits.

TRIGGER. Any slippage of first oil beyond Q4 2028; Brent below US$60 for two consecutive quarters; announcement of a 2030 liability-management exercise; publication of the Staatsolie facility amortisation profile.

This replaces, with evidence, the claim withdrawn in Rev002 that the exposure “necessarily sits in 2028 rather than 2035”. The earlier mixed-scope 2028 coverage of about 0.89× remains withdrawn.

3. Paper I · Debt Before Oil: Two Ledgers, One Treasury Test

GG-2026-029-NSCA · Rev003 · Original publication 12 August 2026 · Web edition

The national question is how much cash reaches the Republic, what obligations fall due, and what remains after payment. GLIAG defines Net Sovereign Cash After Debt Service (NSCA) as Republic petroleum receipts minus Republic interest and principal in the same year, on one stated scope. Production, project revenue, corporate cash, government receipts and spendable budget are five different quantities.

Figure 3. Debt before oil: two ledgers. The GLIAGOGRAPH for this section is in the version of record: download the Rev003 PDF from Zenodo.

Ledger A, the Republic. Royalty, government profit oil, petroleum income tax and actual Staatsolie dividends and taxes paid, minus Republic debt service. Les Echos reports that Staatsolie already provided about one third of public revenue in the preceding year (Les Echos); until first oil, the Treasury collects only taxes and dividends from the existing state oil company (Rio Times).

Ledger B, Staatsolie. The 20% GranMorgu participation needs about US$2.4 billion, financed by a US$1.6 billion facility from 18 banks, the March 2025 bond of US$515.8 million and own reserves; the facility also repaid a US$130 million loan (Staatsolie; Staatsolie 2025 bond prospectus). Corporate costs, taxes, interest, principal and retained liquidity come before any dividend. GLIAG analysed this structure in the investor briefing on the US$1.6 billion facility (July 2025), Staatsolie’s financial future beyond traditional metrics (June 2026) and Staatsolie’s strategic shift (July 2026).

No double count. Subtracting Staatsolie’s debt service again when the Republic receives a dividend counts the same burden twice. The Rev001 formula allowed this error and remains withdrawn. A consolidated public-sector view may combine both ledgers only after eliminating internal transfers, and is never labelled Treasury cash.

Cash after debt is not all spendable. The 2024 SSFS Act routes all mineral revenue to the fund from 2026 and lets the budget set the maximum withdrawal, but the law does not define natural resource revenues (IMF 2025 Article IV). The government plans three pillars (savings, stabilisation, development) with the amending law to the National Assembly in H2 2027 (Government of Suriname), and the 30 September 2026 Annual Address committed to an operational SSFS before the first deposit (Government of Suriname). Escrow drawdowns, borrowing and IPO proceeds are funding, not recurrent revenue. GLIAG’s legal work on creating a legal fiscal ring fence, distinguishing contractual and fiscal rings and legal strategies for protecting petroleum income (July 2026) sets out the statutory options.

Source vintages. The VRI repurchase is reported by the IMF as 16 January 2026, by the government budget strategy as completed in 2025 (Begrotingsstrategie 2027) and by the President as lifted (Rio Times). GLIAG records agreement in 2025 and settlement in January 2026; the original VRI paid 30% of Block 58 royalties after the first US$100 million, capped at about US$787 million (FinDevLab; Government of Suriname, 2023; De Ware Tijd/DBS).

The national conversion test. Track local suppliers paid, domestic value added, local wages, certification and productive capacity beside the fiscal ledger. GranMorgu is expected to create more than 6,000 direct and indirect jobs (Americas Quarterly). Local procurement is not automatically tax revenue. GLIAG’s framework for sustainable local content (June 2026), local content in comparative perspective (June 2025) and turning petroleum wealth into national capability (July 2026) define the test.

FACT. Republic and Staatsolie cash are legally and financially separate; the VRI is retired; the known Eurobond layer is US$152.2 million a year plus bullets of US$525 million in 2030 and US$1,315 million in 2035.

MISSING. The full Republic schedule, Staatsolie’s loan tenor and dividend policy, and a statutory definition of petroleum revenue for SSFS deposits.

GLIAG JUDGEMENT. The Republic’s binding constraint in 2028–2030 is legal routing and timing, not volume. A Treasury that receives royalty before the SSFS can lawfully receive it faces either an unlawful deposit gap or a temporary account that markets will read as discretionary spending.

TRIGGER. Tabling of the SSFS amendment; constitution of the SSFS board; a Staatsolie dividend declaration for fiscal year 2028.

6. Guyana as benchmark: the fund rule matters more than the fund

Guyana’s Natural Resource Fund held US$4.29 billion at 30 June 2026, with an approved 2026 withdrawal of US$2.374 billion after US$2.463 billion in 2025 (Bank of Guyana). The 2024 amendment raised the withdrawal ceiling sharply (IMF Guyana 2025 Article IV). Guyana collected about US$2.47 billion in one year while Suriname waits for 2028 (Suriname Herald).

GLIAG JUDGEMENT. The lesson for Suriname is that the withdrawal rule, not the existence of a fund, determines the spendable layer and therefore the credit story. GLIAG compared both strategies in oil wealth management: Guyana and Suriname (May 2025) and strategic financial wisdom for Suriname’s offshore wealth (March 2025).

9. Decision triggers and monitoring calendar

Date or event What it changes GIP module
H2 2027: SSFS amendment tabled Legal routing of first royalty; spendable layer NSC-01, BBS-01
31 Dec 2027: debt-ceiling waiver expires 60% legal ceiling against 119.6% ratio NSC-01
Mid-2028: GranMorgu first oil Royalty start; escrow coverage ends 2028 RIC-01
FY2028 Staatsolie results First dividend capacity after facility service NSC-01 (Ledger B)
2029: plateau of about 86 MMbbl/yr Profit oil and tax calendar RIC-01, SIM-01
2030: US$525m bullet First concentrated Republic test NSC-01
2035: US$1,315m bullet Second test, after five plateau years NSC-01
Next S&P, Moody’s or IMF vintage Baseline refresh; source-conflict log All

10. Corrections register: Rev002 to Rev003

  1. S&P source link corrected from article id 3656917 (a Harris County municipal utility district record) to id 3656918.
  2. VRI: “any surviving VRI payment” replaced by evidence of repurchase (IMF, 16 January 2026), with the 2025/2026 vintage difference recorded.
  3. New Section 2: a partial Republic Eurobond calendar from public terms, cross-checked against the US$152.2 million escrow figure. No full DSCR is asserted.
  4. GranMorgu capex: operator FID figure US$10.5 billion retained; later reports near US$12 billion flagged [VERIFY].
  5. Staatsolie financing completed: US$2.4 billion need, US$1.6 billion facility (about 35% of GDP), US$515.8 million bond.
  6. IMF adverse scenario quantified ($53/bbl, delay to H2 2029, volume −34%; 2031 revenue −21%).
  7. 2027 budget, legal debt ratio and debt-service share added.
  8. SSFS timetable risk and Guyana NRF benchmark added.
  9. Public State-take estimates (Staatsolie, Moody’s, Latinvex, FT) set against the historic 42.3%.
  10. GLIAGOGRAPHs redrawn; Rev002 figure boxes ran past the right frame.
  11. ENSCA arithmetic re-verified: 18 and 17 full-year equivalents, US$14,411 million base, 5,043.85 at 35%.

11. Methods and revision record

Rev001 combined selected sovereign and assumed project obligations. Rev002 separated the Republic and Staatsolie, withdrew the mixed-scope residual and redrew the figures. Rev003 adds the first instrument-level anchor, the VRI retirement, the IMF adverse case, the 2027 fiscal position, the SSFS timetable, public State-take benchmarks and the GIP integration path. Royalty arithmetic uses 6.25% of gross revenue at Brent without differential; a realised-price discount lowers the result. Missing values remain missing, not zero. Earlier text and figures are preserved in the GLIAG revision archive and must not be cited as the current Treasury forecast.

References

  1. S&P Global Ratings, “Suriname Upgraded To ‘B-/B’ From ‘CCC+/C’ On Economic Prospects; Outlook Stable”, 9 November 2026. https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/3656918
  2. IMF, Suriname: Post-Financing Assessment, Country Report 2026/131, 10 June 2026, DOI 10.5089/9798229049863.002.A001. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/131/article-A001-en.xml
  3. IMF, Suriname: 2025 Article IV Consultation, Country Report 2026/037. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2026/037/article-A001-en.xml
  4. IMF, Suriname: Technical Assistance Report, Strengthening the Fiscal Framework, May 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/technical-assistance-reports/issues/2026/05/15/suriname-technical-assistance-report-strengthening-the-fiscal-framework-ahead-of-the-576133
  5. Moody’s Ratings, Suriname Caa1 positive, 27 March 2026. https://surinamenieuwscentrale.com/sites/default/files/Moody-Suriname%20Caa1.pdf
  6. Financial Times, “Why Big Oil is opening new frontiers”, FT Film, 2026. https://www.ft.com/video/2fbaa2f4-55e8-40e5-af25-d6a743d5a78c
  7. Bloomberg, “Suriname Tapping Global Debt Markets as Investors Hunt for Yield”, 30 October 2025. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-30/suriname-tapping-global-debt-markets-as-investors-hunt-for-yield
  8. Clifford Chance, US$1.575 billion sovereign bond offer, November 2025. https://www.cliffordchance.com/news/news/2025/11/clifford-chance-advises-on-us-1-575-billion-sovereign-bond-offer.html
  9. Les Echos, “Au Suriname, la redistribution de la manne pétrolière au coeur des élections”, 2025. https://www.lesechos.fr/monde/ameriques/au-suriname-la-redistribution-de-la-manne-petroliere-au-coeur-des-elections-2167229
  10. Americas Quarterly, “Suriname’s President Prepares for an Oil Boom”, 2026. https://americasquarterly.org/article/surinames-president-prepares-for-an-oil-boom
  11. TotalEnergies, GranMorgu final investment decision, 1 October 2024. https://totalenergies.com/newsroom/suriname-totalenergies-announces-final-investment-decision-granmorgu/?lang=eng
  12. TotalEnergies, GranMorgu project page. https://totalenergies.com/company/projects/oil/granmorgu-suriname-oil-project-line-totalenergies-transition-strategy
  13. Staatsolie, financing announcement, 14 May 2025. https://www.staatsolie.com/nl/nieuws/groot-inter-nationaal-vertrouwen-in-staatsolie-en-het-granmorgu-project/
  14. Staatsolie, GranMorgu progress, 21 September 2026. https://www.staatsolie.com/nl/nieuws/bezoek-ceo-totalenergies-onderstreept-voortgang-granmorgu-project/
  15. Staatsolie, 2025 bond prospectus. https://staatsolieobligatie.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/250130-Staatsolie-Prospectus.pdf
  16. Government of Suriname, SSFS legal safeguards. https://gov.sr/verantwoord-beheer-olie-inkomsten-wordt-wettelijk-gewaarborgd-duurzaam-beheer-olie-inkomsten-wordt-wettelijk-verankerd/
  17. Government of Suriname, SSFS operationalisation, 30 September 2026. https://gov.sr/regering-streeft-naar-spoedige-operationalisering-spaar-en-stabilisatie-fonds/
  18. Government of Suriname, 2027 budget. https://gov.sr/regering-wil-begrotingstekort-terugdringen-met-beheersing-uitgaven-en-extra-inkomsten/
  19. Government of Suriname, Begrotingsstrategie 2027. https://gov.sr/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Begrotingsstrategie_2027.pdf
  20. Government of Suriname, bondholder restructuring finalised, 2023. https://gov.sr/herstructurering-bondholders-gefinaliseerd/
  21. De Ware Tijd / DBS, “VRI van bondholders afgekocht”, 19 December 2025. https://www.dbsuriname.com/2025/12/19/vri-van-bondholders-afgekocht
  22. FinDevLab, Eurobond market short note, January 2026. http://findevlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/FDL_Short-Note_Eurobond-Market-The-tide-rising-but-not-all-boats-are-equal_Jules-Devie_Jan26.pdf
  23. Rio Times, Suriname debt plan and new loans, 2026. https://www.riotimesonline.com/suriname-850-million-new-loans-debt-question-2026/
  24. Rio Times, oil money, prices and funds, 9 November 2026. https://www.riotimesonline.com/suriname-simons-oil-money-prices-citizens-funds/
  25. Rio Times, budget deficit dispute, 1 November 2026. https://www.riotimesonline.com/suriname-budget-deficit-dispute-economists-oil-revenue-2026
  26. Rio Times, GranMorgu on schedule, 10 November 2026. https://www.riotimesonline.com/suriname-granmorgu-oil-first-oil-on-schedule/
  27. Suriname Herald, Guyana US$2.47 billion and Staatsolie State-take estimates, September 2026. https://www.srherald.com/economie/2026/09/13/guyana-incasseert-us-247-miljard-in-een-jaar-suriname-wacht-op-oliemiljarden-vanaf-2028/
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  30. Bank of Guyana, Half-Year Report 2026. https://bankofguyana.org.gy/bog3/images/research/Reports/HalfYear2026.pdf
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  32. IMF, Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries: Design and Implementation, 2012. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/policy-papers/issues/2016/12/31/fiscal-regimes-for-extractive-industries-design-and-implementation-pp4701
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  34. Baunsgaard et al., Fiscal Frameworks for Resource Rich Developing Countries, IMF SDN/12/04. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1204.pdf
  35. IMF, Fiscal Analysis of Resource Industries (FARI). https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fiscal-policies/fiscal-analysis-of-resource-industries
  36. IMF Working Paper 2024/089. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2024/089/article-A001-en.xml
  37. IMF Working Paper 2023/230. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2023/230/article-A001-en.xml
  38. NRGI, Natural Resource Charter Decision Chain. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_NRC-Decision-Chain.pdf
  39. IFSWF, Santiago Principles. https://www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles
  40. van der Ploeg, F., “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?”, Journal of Economic Literature 49(2), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.49.2.366
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GLIAG research records on Zenodo

Further GLIAG essays on Petroleum & Energy Insights

About the author

Drs. Marcel P. T. Chin-A-Lien, MBA, M.Sc., Ing., geologist, is Principal Founding Partner and Chief Architect of GLIAG. AAPG Certified Petroleum Geologist #5201-1996; EFG European Geologist #92-1996; AIEN Energy Negotiator. He works from Zoetermeer and Paramaribo on the petroleum systems, fiscal design and development strategy of the Guyana–Suriname Basin, and designed GIP.

About GLIAG

GLIAG (Golden Lane Investments Advisory Group) is an independent petroleum, energy and strategic-advisory platform focused on Suriname, Guyana and the wider Caribbean–South American region. It acts as Owner’s Engineer, project-management consultant and strategic adviser to governments, national oil companies, development-finance institutions and investors, and develops GIP through GLIAG Intelligence B.V.

Competing interests and disclaimer

The author leads GLIAG, which develops GIP and licenses it commercially. GLIAG is not a sponsor of, or equity investor in, any project or licence discussed. Gas-to-Shore and the New Refinery are GLIAG proposals, not sanctioned projects.

This publication is for information only and is not investment, legal, tax or accounting advice. Forward-looking statements and scenarios are conditional and may differ materially from outcomes. Third-party data remain the property and responsibility of their owners; GLIAG has not audited them. Readers should obtain independent professional advice before acting.

© 2026 Marcel P. T. Chin-A-Lien and GLIAG Intelligence B.V. Licensed CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Version of record: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24114928. Text and data mining reserved under Article 4(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/790. Correspondence: info@gliag.com.

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